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ENVIRONMENTAL UPDATES
Prairie Band Pottawatomie Nation v. Federal Highway Administration,
No. 08-2534-KHV, 2009 WL 4016106 (D. Kan. Nov. 18, 2009)
Prairie Band Pottawatomie Nation v. Federal Highway
Administration (hereinafter "FHA") involved a proposal to construct a
southern bypass around the city of Lawrence, KS. In May of 2001, the
Kansas Department of Transportation (hereinafter "KDOT") announced
that it would begin evaluating proposals for building the bypass and asked
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (hereinafter "ACE") to ensure the
bypass complied with environmental standards. The ACE subsequently
created an Environmental Impact Statement, approved the bypass, and
issued KDOT a permit for the route which was approved by the FHA.
A portion of the bypass called the 32nd Street route will bisect the
Haskell-Baker Wetlands near the Haskell Indian Nations University in
Lawrence. These wetlands are historically and culturally significant to
Haskell students and Native Americans nearby. These Native Americans,
joined by other environmental groups, brought action against the Federal
Highway Administration, Michael Bowen, the FHA Division
Administrator, KDOT, and KDOT Secretary Debra Miller. Along with
other claims, plaintiffs alleged violations of the Clean Water Act, arguing
that the 32nd Street route of the bypass would destroy fifty-five acres of
wetlands, affect water quality, and also impact 2800 feet of water flow.
Plaintiffs asserted two claims under the Clean Water Act. First,
they claimed that the FHA and KDOT, along with its officers, neither
overcame the presumption of non-water alternatives for the bypass nor
considered less harmful alternatives. Second, they claimed that there was
no consideration of the possibility for mitigating the impact of the bypass.
The Clean Water Act, in part, governs the discharge of materials
into navigable waters. Section 404(b) of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344, states
that the Army may issue permits for the discharge of such materials.
Regulations promulgated under the Act, 40 C.F.R. § 230.10, direct the
ACE to decline a permit for depositing such material when that deposit
would result in an unacceptable adverse impact or when an alternative to
the proposal would have less of a harmful impact on the environment.
The court sustained the motion for dismissal of all claims against
Bowen and Miller. The court ruled that the claims against the individuals
were made against them acting in their official capacities. The court
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reasoned that such claims actually constituted claims against the FHA and
KDOT and since FHA and KDOT were already named as defendants in
the case, it was unnecessary for the plaintiffs to name the individual
defendants.
The court also dismissed the claims against the FHA and KDOT.
The court stated that the Clean Water Act gives the ACE alone the power
to prepare Environmental Impact Statements and decide whether or not to
issue a permit to allow the deposit of fill materials. Therefore, the power
to issue a permit for the construction of the bypass rested solely with the
ACE. Thus, the court held that only the ACE could properly be named as





Water Works & Sewer Board v. Inland Lake Investments, L.L.C., No.
1070030, 2009 WL 2723203 (Ala. Aug. 28, 2009)
Inland Lake Investments (hereinafter "ILI") began constructing a
development next to the Water Works and Sewer Board's (hereinafter "the
Board") property and adjacent to Inland Lake (hereinafter "the Lake"),
which the Board used as a major water source for supplying drinking
water to nearby counties. Despite the Board telling ILI that the Board
would need to review ILI's development plans, including sediment and
erosion control, before the Board could approve the construction, ILI
began construction. As construction began, the Board observed sediment
entering Sawmill Slough, a tributary of the Lake on its property. Further,
during a heavy rain, the Board witnessed muddy water streaming from
ILI's property into the Lake.
An expert on sediment control testified that almost no controls had
been implemented on ILI's property and that the property drained onto the
Board's property. He continued to state that the controls would not be
adequate to prevent further sediment discharge during later heavy rains.
Beyond just this, an Alabama Department of Environmental Management
environmental scientist visited the site and observed sediment from ILI's
property to the Lake. According to the Board's water treatment manager,
the increased sediment in the water, which he had witnessed, would
require more chemical treatment. This resulted in a sludge that was more
expensive to dispose of than normal but could be removed.
It was under these circumstances that the Board brought a suit
against ILI claiming continuing trespass, among other claims, and asking
for a preliminary injunction. The trial court found that because the
sediment could be removed after each trespass, no irreparable injury
existed. Therefore, the court held that there was an adequate remedy at
law and denied the Board's preliminary injunction.
The Alabama Supreme Court addressed the issue beginning with a
review of irreparable damages. The court reflected that this injury is one
that cannot be fixed solely by money or other remedies. It then went on to
examine a similar case where a dam regularly overflowed at high tide.
The court stated that it held in that case that the ability to rectify the
damages does not matter in reoccurring injuries because a single suit will
not fix the problem. Therefore, the court stated that the law has the ability
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to prevent the harm. In this case the Board would have to bring a claim
anytime it rained, which, according to the court, is simply unproductive
and wasteful. The court also referred to the principle that injunctions are
appropriate when damages are insufficient due to the need for multiple
suits. This led the court to hold that there was a continuing trespass every
time it rained severely and thus compensation would be inadequate
because the trespass continued and created the need for multiple actions.
However, because a preliminary injunction requires that the harms to ILI
not unreasonably outweigh the advantages to the Board, which was not





Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009)
The Fifth Circuit recently decided a case which held that owners of
land and property along the Mississippi Gulf Coast had standing to bring
nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims against oil and coal companies.
The plaintiffs' claims maintained that the defendants' emitted greenhouse
gasses through their operation of energy, fossil fuels, and chemical
industries in the United States. The plaintiffs' claimed that the
defendants' contribution to global warming ultimately lead to a rise in sea
levels, which added to Hurricane Katrina's ferocity.
The plaintiffs' class action lawsuit sought compensatory and
punitive damages under various claims based on Mississippi common law
including public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, negligence, and
others. The defendants' filed a motion to dismiss, maintaining that the
plaintiffs lacked standing and that the claims also presented a
nonjusticiable political question. The plaintiffs appealed from the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi's decision
granting the motion to dismiss.
One of the central questions before the Fifth Circuit was whether
the plaintiffs had standing to assert their claims. The Fifth Circuit held
that the plaintiffs established standing for the nuisance, trespass, and
negligence claims. With Mississippi's liberal standing requirements, the
only obstacle before the plaintiffs was meeting the federal law's standing
requirement that the injury suffered must be fairly traceable to the
defendants' actions. The defendants contended that the injury was too
attenuated and that its actions were only one of the many contributions to
gas emissions. In holding that the traceability element of standing was
met, the Fifth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court decision of
Massachusetts v. EPA. In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court accepted
both the link between man-made greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming and also the link between rising ocean temperatures and the
intensity of hurricanes. The Fifth Circuit also relied on another portion of
the Massachusetts's decision, holding that the defendants need not be the
sole or material cause to global warming, but rather, the defendants need
only contribute to global warming.
Another issue before the Fifth Circuit was determining whether the
case presented a nonjusticiable political question. In making this
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determination, the Fifth Circuit applied the formulations set forth in the
Supreme Court's decision in Baker v. Carr. The five formulations applied
included: whether the case presented a textual commitment of the issues to
another political branch, an absence in a judicially manageable standard
for adjudicating the claims, a need for nonjudicial policy determinations in
adjudicating the case, whether the judicial decision would imply a lack of
respect for a coordinate branch, and whether the judicial decision would
cause any potential embarrassment from different pronouncements by
various federal departments on the one question. The Fifth Circuit held
that the defendants failed to establish that the issue was committed to
another federal political branch. In the holding, the Fifth Circuit noted
that common law tort claims are rarely thought to present nonjusticiable
political questions because there are clear and well-settled rules for the
courts to apply.
In finding the nuisance, trespass, and negligence claims as





Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., No. C 08-1138 SBA,
2009 WL 3326113 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2009)
This action arose as a result of the Native Village of Kivalina
(hereinafter "Kivalina" or "the Village") bringing a nuisance suit against
ExxonMobil, along with twenty-four energy and utility companies
(hereinafter "Exxon"), in order to recover damages due to global warming.
The Village is located on the tip of a barrier reef seventy miles north of the
Arctic Circle, with the Village's coastline being protected by sea ice that
acted as a barrier to sea storms. Kivalina alleged that due to global
warming, the Arctic sea ice shielding Kivalina from winter storms has
diminished, resulting in the erosion that forces Kivalina to relocate.
Kivalina is suing Exxon for monetary damages due to Exxon's alleged
role in contributing to global warming that has resulted in the ice erosion.
The court discussed two questions. First, the court sought to
determine if a political question existed by evaluating whether the court
would have to make a policy determination relating to the use of fossil
fuels and a subsequent consideration of the fossil fuels' value in relation to
the environmental, economic, and social consequences of the use. Second,
the court evaluated whether Kivalina had Article III standing to bring suit
by examining whether the global warming claims were fairly traceable to
Exxon's conduct.
Addressing the political question first, the court dismissed
Kivalina's complaint because the issue was outside of the Article III
jurisdiction of federal courts. The court relied on two determinations in
reaching the conclusion that it did not have jurisdiction. First, the court
found no textually demonstrable constitutional commitment to the issue
and no judicially discoverable or manageable standards to guide a
reasoned ruling, one way or the other. In looking to prior decisions, the
court could not find any precedent to guide a decision concerning
weighing the costs and benefits of using fossil fuels or energy alternatives
to address climate change through the reduced emission of greenhouse
gases. Second, the court asserted that Kivalina's claim brought forth
initial policy determinations about who should bear the cost of global
warming and this determination was more appropriate for the legislative or
executive branch.
238
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 17, No. 1
In turning to the question of whether Kivalina had Article III
standing, the court focused on the chain of causation requirement and
whether Kivalina could prove that Exxon's conduct caused Kivalina's
injury. Here, the court concluded that Kivalina did not have standing, as
the Village could not show that its damages were dependent on a series of
events removed "both in space and time" from Exxon's conduct.
Additionally, the court held that the Village was not entitled to special
sovereign standing.
The court granted Exxon's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction and subsequently dismissed Kivalina's state law claims




North Carolina v. EPA, 587 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
The D.C. Circuit recently rejected a petition by the State of North
Carolina to reinstate the northern portion of the State of Georgia to EPA's
regulations under the national ambient air quality standard (hereinafter
"NAAQS") for one-hour ozone. The court found that North Carolina
failed to meet the redressability prong of the Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildife standing requirements because its requested remedy was not
likely to redress its injury.
In 1979, EPA established the first NAAQS for ozone--0.120 ppm
as measured over the course of one hour (hereinafter "one-hour ozone
standard"). In 1997, EPA tightened the standard to .08 ppm over the
course of eight hours (hereinafter the "eight-hour ozone standard"). EPA
transitioned from the one-hour standard to the eight-hour standard in 2004.
EPA lowered the eight-hour ozone standard again to 0.075 ppm effective
May 27, 2008.
Nitrogen oxide (hereinafter NOx), a precursor to the formulation of
ozone, is regulated by EPA under state implementation plans (hereinafter
"SIPs"). In 1998, EPA issued findings that Georgia's NOx emissions
significantly contributed to violations of the one-hour ozone standard in
the downwind cities of Birmingham, Alabama and Memphis, Tennessee.
EPA also found that Georgia significantly contributed to violations of the
eight-hour ozone standard in North Carolina. Consequently, EPA required
upwind states like Georgia (including Missouri) to revise their SIPs to
account for these conclusions. This action is known as the NOx SIP Call.
In 2001, the D.C. Circuit held in Michigan v. EPA that EPA should
implement more refined modeling to reduce the scope of the NOx SIP Call
from considering states as a whole to considering the specific regions
within each state contributing to downwind ozone nonattainment. In
response to this decision, EPA narrowed the NOx SIP Call to the northern
portion of Georgia; in Missouri, EPA narrowed the NOx SIP Call to the
eastern portion of Missouri. The rule was published on April 21, 2004, to
be effective on June 21, but by April 12, EPA had determined that
Memphis and Birmingham were complying with the one-hour ozone
standard. The Georgia Coalition for Sound Environmental Policy, an
industry group that intervened in this case (hereinafter "Industry"),
successfully petitioned EPA to reconsider the inclusion of northern
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Georgia in the one-hour NOx SIP Call. Georgia was officially removed
from the NOx SIP Call in 2008 by the "Withdrawal Rule," upon which
North Carolina petitioned the D.C. Circuit for review.
In Lujan, the Supreme Court held that petitioners must establish
three elements for standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability.
North Carolina argued that it met the three requirements. North Carolina
contended that it is injured by emissions from northern Georgia that
significantly contribute to North Carolina's nonattainment under the eight-
hour ozone standard because northern Georgia is no longer subject to the
requirements of the one-hour NOx SIP Call. North Carolina also argued
that its injury could be remedied if the Court vacated the portion of the
Withdrawal Rule exempting northern Georgia from the one-hour NOx SIP
Call.
Intervenor Industry contended that North Carolina lacked standing
for failure to demonstrate redressability. Under Lujan, it must be "likely,"
not just "speculative," that a "favorable decision" would redress the
petitioner's injury. Intervenor Industry pointed to evidence submitted by
intervenor Georgia Environmental Protection Division (hereinafter
"Division") that reinstatement of northern Georgia to the NOx SIP Call
would not reduce emissions traveling from Georgia to North Carolina.
Even if reinstated, northern Georgia would meet its emission cap without
actually having to reduce its emissions due to the availability of emission
credits under EPA's compliance supplement pool allowances.
While the court agreed with Petitioner North Carolina that it had
sustained injury caused by NOx-emitting generating units in northern
Georgia, the court ultimately sided with intervenors and respondents on
the redressability issue. The court found the Division's evidence that
Georgia's emissions would remain at current levels no matter the outcome
of the case to be dispositive. Because the reinstatement of northern
Georgia to the NOx SIP Call would not likely result in lower ozone levels
in North Carolina, North Carolina's injury was not redressable. North





Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. United States, 129 S. Ct.
1870 (2009)
This appeal arose after the United States (hereinafter "US")
brought an action against the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway
Company, and the Southern Pacific Transportation Company (now known
respectively as the Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company
and Union Pacific Railroad Company) (hereinafter "the Railway") and the
Shell Oil Company (hereinafter "Shell") seeking reimbursement for
hazardous material cleanup costs under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (hereinafter "CERCLA").
The Act was passed by Congress to hold landowners of property on which
there is hazardous waste contamination as well as those originally
responsible for the contamination liable for the costs of having it removed.
US argued that both the Railway, which leased part of the property that
had been contaminated by hazardous waste, and Shell, which sold the
chemicals to the property owner, Brown & Bryant, Inc. allowed the
hazardous materials to escape onto the land and cause the contamination,
and therefore ought to be held jointly and severally liable for the cleanup
costs under CERCLA.
After a six week bench trial, the District Court for the Eastern
District of California found in favor of the government as to the Railway's
and Shell's liability; however, the court felt that the damages could be
apportioned between the two companies and the property owner, as
opposed to holding the Railway and Shell jointly and severally liable. US
appealed the decision as to apportionment of damages and Shell cross-
appealed its liability under CERCLA. The Ninth Circuit held that the
district court erred with respect to not holding the Railway and Shell
jointly and severally liable and affirmed Shell's liability. Both the
Railway and Shell appealed to the Supreme Court.
The two issues before the Court were: 1) whether Shell could be
held liable under CERCLA and 2) whether the Railway and Shell could be
held jointly and severally liable. The Court addressed the first issue
noting that under the circumstances, Shell could only be held liable if it
were found to be an arranger. According to the Court, for Shell to be an
arranger it must have arranged for the disposal of hazardous substances.
US argued that the mere fact that Shell acknowledged that during delivery
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some of the hazardous waste leaked, qualified Shell as an arranger. The
Court, in an eight to one decision, however, disagreed with US and held
that Shell was not an arranger under the statute because a plain language
reading of the statute would require that Shell intended to allow the
hazardous substances to leak upon transfer, and under the facts Shell
encouraged facilities and shippers to increase the efficiency of its transfers
and the integrity of its chemical holding tanks with price discounts and,
later, by mandating these higher standards. This reaffirmed the holdings
of most other circuits, which hold that sellers who merely sold hazardous
substances that were still suitable to use and sold them in such a way as to
not intentionally allow the release or improper disposal of these materials
into the environment, were not arrangers and, thus, not liable under
CERCLA. This holding removed Shell from the second inquiry of the
Court.
In taking up the second issue, whether the Railway could be held
to joint and several liability under CERCLA, the Court stated that
although CERCLA imposed a strict liability standard on persons shown to
be responsible for the release of hazardous waste into the environment, it
did not require that every court hold all offenders to joint and several
liability. Instead, the Court said that CERCLA provides that where
apportionment of damages can be ascertained, offenders should be held to
their proportion of the harm. And because the facts adduced at trial,
according to the Court, reasonably supported the district court's
approximation of harm for which the Railway was responsible and its
ruling that apportionment was appropriate, the Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit, which had held that apportionment under CERCLA was only
appropriate when supported by ample evidence to establish the degrees of




Wyoming v. United States Department of Interior, 587 F.3d 1245 (10th
Cir. 2009)
The National Park Service (hereinafter "Park Service") was
instructed by executive order in 1974 to establish policies for the use of
off-road vehicles in national parks. As a result, one of the rules the Park
Service adopted was that the use of snowmobiles was prohibited, except
on designated routes. Over the years, special rules were promulgated that
designated those routes within Yellowstone National Park (hereinafter
"Yellowstone"), but failed to limit the number of snowmobiles allowed.
From that omission, in 2001, a see-saw, multi-jurisdictional legal battle
ensued that saw numerous actions filed in both D.C. and Wyoming district
courts. Essentially, snowmobiling opponents filed suit in D.C. district
court to reduce or eliminate snowmobile use in Yellowstone; while,
conversely, snowmobiling proponents filed suit in Wyoming district court
to increase snowmobile access to the park. With each subsequent
settlement or judgment, the number of snowmobiles permitted in the park
fluctuated wildly.
The instant case centered on a rule passed by the Park Service in
2007 that allowed 540 snowmobiles access into the park daily. Nearly
simultaneous challenges were filed in D.C. and Wyoming that alleged the
rule was invalid because it permitted either too few or too many
snowmobiles. Handing down its decision first, the D.C. district court
invalidated the rule as "arbitrary and capricious" because it allowed more
snowmobiles than the court believed were permitted by law.
While the Park Service commenced work on a new rule, the
Wyoming district court resolved what it considered to be the unresolved
question in the case: how many snowmobiles were permitted until a new
rule could be handed down? The Wyoming court decided that, as a stop-
gap measure, 720 snowmobiles per day should be allowed to enter
Yellowstone. On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, a conservation group
(hereinafter "appellants") maintained that the D.C. district court's decision
vacating the 2007 rule rendered the Wyoming case moot. In the
intervening period, on November 20, 2009, the Park Service promulgated
a new temporary rule allowing 318 snowmobiles to enter Yellowstone
each day.
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In arriving at its decision, the Tenth Circuit first determined that
the Wyoming district court's stop-gap decision at issue on appeal was, by
its own terms, effective only until the Park Service adopted a new rule.
With the promulgation of that rule, the court believed that the Wyoming
district court's order had expired by its own terms. Since, as the court
noted, the appellants' desire was to declare the Wyoming district court
without authority to dictate the number of snowmobiles this winter, the
court could offer no more relief from that order than the new Park Service
regulation already provided. Thus, the court held that the Park Service's
rule, by eliminating the issues upon which the case was based, rendered
the appeal moot.
Moreover, the Tenth Circuit rejected the appellants' contention
that the Wyoming district court's order should remain in effect since the
Park Service had not promulgated a permanent rule. Without any support
in the order's language for such an interpretation, the court found that to
be an unreasonable reading. The opinion of the Wyoming district court
stated only that the Park Service must pass an "acceptable" rule, and by
"acceptable," the district court was referencing compliance with the D.C.
district court's ruling that required less snowmobiles. If, as the Tenth
Circuit believed, the Wyoming district court desired to avoid conflict with
the D.C. court proceedings, then the court found it implausible that the
Wyoming court would have intentionally produced such a conflict by
dictating what type of rule should be adopted.
After determining that the November 2009 Park Service regulation
effectively mooted the case, the court vacated the Wyoming district





Slokish v. United States Federal Highway Administration, No. CV-08-
1169-ST, 2009 WL 3335320 (D. Or. 2009)
In 2008, the Wildwood-Wemme highway widening project ("the
project") was substantially completed near Mt. Hood, OR. The Plaintiffs
consist of individuals and organizations who sought to preserve, protect,
and rehabilitate Native American sacred and cultural sites and historical
and archaeological resources in the lands surrounding Mt. Hood.
Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants violated the National Historic
Preservation Act ("NHPA"), the National Environmental Policy Act and §
4f of the Department of Transportation Act. The defendants include the
United States Federal Highway Administration (hereinafter "FHWA"),
United States Bureau of Land Management, Advisory Council on Historic
Preservation, and Matthew Garrett, Director of the Oregon Department of
Transportation.
The Klickitat and Cascade Tribes, as well as each leader
individually, claimed injury because the project is to be located within
traditional cultural property. Carol Logan is a resident of Oregon and is of
Native American ancestry; she is a member of the Mt. Hood Sacred Land
Preservation Alliance (hereinafter "MHSLPA"), a group which has been
campaigning to protect the area since the 1980s and often uses the area for
cultural, religious, recreational, and aesthetic purposes. The Cascade
Geographic Society (hereinafter "CGS") is a nonprofit corporation that is
dedicated to preserving and promoting the cultural, historical, and natural
resources of the Cascade Mountain Range and its rivers, and also uses the
area affected by the project for cultural, recreational, and aesthetic
purposes.
The stretch of highway particularly at issue here is a right-of-way
next to the Mountain Air Park subdivision of the Wildwood Recreation
Area situated between the villages of Wildwood and Wemme near the
town of Welches. Another portion of the right-of-way includes a section of
the A.J. Dwyer Scenic Area. As the project continued the contractors
began cutting trees out of the right-of-ways, including old-growth Douglas
Fir trees.
The defendants asserted that the case was moot because the
Wildwood-Wemme project was substantially complete, and all the
remaining tasks were limited to areas already impacted by the project. The
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court held that the case was not moot because there was a continuing harm
and stated that if refused to reward the defendants' efficiency in
completing the project by shielding them from their obligations under the
NHPA provisions. The court explained that it was irrelevant whether or
not the building project was substantially complete because the harm was
continuing due to the construction efforts, and that harm was in violation
of the NHPA provisions.
The defendants also argued that none of the plaintiffs had standing
to bring the claim. The court agreed with the defendants as to the Klickitat
and Cascade tribes, as well as each leader, as they do not assert that they
ever visited, used, or planned to visit the area impacted by the project;
therefore, both the tribes and their leaders lacked injury sufficient to
establish standing. Standing was held to be sufficient as to Logan, the
MHSLPA, and CGS, as each stated prior use of the area and intent to
return, so an injury in fact existed.
The defendants further urge that the plaintiffs' NHPA claims
should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. In particular, the
defendants want the claims regarding to the tribes who lacked standing to
be dismissed. The court stated that the fact that the tribes and their
respective chiefs lack standing is not fatal to the claims because Logan has
sufficient standing to assert the various claims at issue. The court held that
even though the tribes and their chiefs did not have standing to bring the
claims, Logan did. Logan could bring all the claims under the NHPA
because the NHPA is designed to cover a broad class of individuals and
any pleadings must be construed broadly in favor of the plaintiffs, and




California Energy Commission v. Department of Energy, 585 F.3d 1143
(9th Cir. 2009)
In recent years, California began experiencing a critical water
crisis. The state's population is expected to grow in the next thirty years,
so it is expected that the need for water will also continue to grow. While
this need for water is increasing, California's water supply is decreasing
due to problems such as over-appropriated surface waters, over-drafted
groundwater aquifers, and salt water contamination.
In an attempt to combat this water crisis, the California Legislature
required the California Energy Commission (hereinafter "CEC") to
establish water efficiency standards for residential washing machines,
which accounts for twenty-two percent of a typical household's water
usage. To do this, CEC established a water factor (hereinafter "WF"),
which is the ratio of gallons of water used per load per the cubic feet of
capacity. The first standard, Tier 1, would have taken effect on January 1,
2007, and would have required all washers (top and front loading) to
perform at a WF of no more than eight and a half. The second standard,
Tier 2, set to take effect on January 1, 2010, would require all washers to
perform with a WF of no more than six. The Environmental Policy and
Conservation Act (hereinafter "EPCA") preempts any state regulation of a
product covered by federal efficiency standards, and the Department of
Energy (hereinafter "DOE") already has energy efficiency standards for
residential washers. Because the efficiency regulations proposed by CEC
are preempted by the EPCA, CEC was required to petition the DOE for a
request to waive preemption.
First, DOE contended that the EPCA does not grant the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction to review the
denial of the waiver. DOE argued this because the EPCA only allows
review by a United States court of appeals for persons affected by certain
sections (6293, 6294, 6295) of the title. But, the court concluded first that
it had jurisdiction because CEC's petition is related to DOE's authority
under section 6295. In addition, the court looked at NRDC v. Abraham
and found the holding to be applicable in this case. Abraham's holding
stated that the EPCA provided district courts jurisdiction in several
different circumstances, and when there is a "specific statutory grant of
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jurisdiction to the court of appeals, it should be construed in favor of
review by the court of appeals."
After determining that it had proper jurisdiction, the court then
discussed DOE's denial of CEC's petition. DOE denied the petition for
three reasons and argued that its denial was also due to CEC's failure to
provide complete information. The first reason was that there is a three
year statutory delay requirement between the waiver and the date in which
the standard would take effect. The date that the first standard was to take
effect, January 1, 2007, would not have met this three year requirement, as
the petition for the waiver was not accepted until December 23, 2005 and
was not ruled on until December 28, 2006. The court of appeals found
that DOE was viewing the rule as being inflexible, when in practice,
viewing the rule this way would be unworkable. The court concluded the
rule is unworkable because DOE did not provide a date that it would rule
on a waiver application, and DOE took a year to rule on CEC's petition.
Thus, DOE should have been more flexible when determining whether the
three year delay was an issue.
The second reason DOE denied CEC's petition was because CEC
failed to show unusual or compelling state interests, which is required for
DOE to grant the petition. CEC was required to demonstrate interests in
''saving water that are substantially different in nature than those
prevailing" in the states and the water savings resulting from the
regulations would make the regulations necessary when balanced against
alternative approaches. The court examined the data and analyses
submitted by CEC and determined that the cost analysis and Pacific Gas
and Electric study were sufficient for DOE to make a determination of
whether the proposed standards were necessary.
The third reason CEC's petition was denied was that the Tier 2
regulation of requiring all washers to perform below a six WF would make
top-loading washers unavailable. DOE asserted that none of the current
top-loading washers perform at this WF level. But, DOE was required to
prove by a preponderance of evidence that the unavailability of top-
loading machines would occur, and the court found DOE's supporting
evidence insufficient to make that determination.
Therefore, the court in this case found DOE's reasons for denying
CEC's petition unpersuasive. But, the court also found that it is not an
appropriate action for it to grant the petition for the waiver. Thus, the
249
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court reversed DOE's decision and remanded it for further proceedings so
that DOE can consider the other issues that have not yet been resolved.
CARA M. LUCKEY
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Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc.. 575 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2009)
Simsbury-Avon Preservation Society (hereinafter "SAPS")
brought suit against Metacon Gun Club, Inc. alleging unlawful discharge
of lead into soil and nearby wetlands in violation of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (hereinafter "RCRA") and the Clean
Water Act (hereinafter "CWA"). The original suit brought in the District
Court of Connecticut was dismissed and SAPS appealed to the Second
Circuit.
Metacon operated a private shooting range since the 1960's that
covered 137 acres of woods, meadows, wetlands and mountainsides
situated on a flood plain near the Farmington River in Simsbury,
Connecticut. In 2003, the Connecticut Department of Environmental
Protection sampled groundwater and surface waters from the gun range
site, but due to flawed procedures, asked Metacon to resample using
appropriate procedures, and report the findings. The firm that conducted
the testing for Metacon concluded that the shooting activities at Metacon
were not causing ground or surface water contamination at the site. SAPS,
however, conducting its own tests, found to the contrary: that spent
ammunition contaminated various media on the site. It found that this
contamination represented a potential exposure risk for humans and
wildlife, but that an additional investigation and risk assessment would be
needed to determine the degree of risk it presented. Metacon did not have
a hazardous waste disposal permit under the RCRA or a National Pollutant
Discharge System permit, which were required under the CWA for the
discharge of pollutants.
SAPS brought claims against Metacon alleging violations of the
RCRA for disposing of hazardous material without a permit and for
disposing of solid wasted that may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to public health or the environment. SAPS brought
additional claims under the CWA alleging violations for discharging
pollutants without a permit.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit first addressed the
RCRA claims. In order for waste to qualify as a hazardous material, it
must first qualify as a solid waste. In order for SAPS to have been
successful in its claim that Metacon was disposing of hazardous material
without a permit under 40 CFR § 261.2, it would have had to show that
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any spent casings or munitions were discarded materials which were
abandoned by being disposed of or by being accumulated, stored or
treated, but not recycled, before or in lieu of being disposed of. The
district court dismissed this claim, giving deference to the EPA's guideline
that if something is deposited onto land as part of its intended use, then it
is not abandoned material. Because the spent casings and munitions were
deposited onto the land as part of their intended use, Metacon was not
required to obtain a permit under RCRA for the operation of a shooting
range.
The court next looked at the RCRA claim that Metacon had
disposed of solid waste on the site that may present an imminent and
substantial endangerment to public health or the environment. The court
dismissed this claim for insufficient evidence because Metacon
periodically swept the land to remove any spent casings. The court
dismissed for an additional reason argued by Metacon: that there was
insufficient evidence in SAPS reports, and the reports admitted that an
additional investigation and assessment would be needed to determine the
degree of risk that was presented. The samples presented failed to show
the likelihood that existing lead contamination would in fact result in harm
to human health or the environment, and failed to show the severity of any
harm that might occur. Therefore, SAPS' samples alone were insufficient
to form a basis for a jury to conclude that Metacon had violated federal
law.
The court next looked to the allegations that Metacon violated the
CWA by discharging pollutants without a permit. The district court
dismissed this claim on the theory that SAPS failed to show Metacon was
discharging pollutants into navigable waters, and Metacon argued
alternatively that SAPS had failed to show that whether the pollutant, lead,
was discharged from a point source. The court of appeals affirmed on the
point source theory.
A point source is a discreet conveyance from which pollutants may
be discharged. EPA regulations implicate that surface water runoff which
is neither collected nor channeled constitutes nonpoint source pollution
and is thus not subject to the CWA permit requirement. SAPS claim
revolved around two areas on the range; a berm that lined the back of the
gun range to collect spent casings and munitions, and the firing line itself.
There was no evidence that lead was actually leached from the berm into
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groundwater, and not evidence that any runoff was channeled or collected
by man as necessary to make it a point source. Therefore, the court held
that SAPS failed to provide evidence that any lead that may reach into
jurisdictional wetlands from the berm resulted in point source discharge,
and failed to show that lead discharged from the firing line constituted a
discharge into jurisdictional wetlands. Thus a permit for operating the




In re Delta Smelt Consolidated Cases, No. 1:09-CV-407 OWW DLB,
2009 WL 3273843 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009)
This case arises from water district members' challenge to the Fish
and Wildlife Service's biological opinion regarding the effect of state
water project developments on threatened delta smelt, an endangered
species of fish endemic to the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta in
California. Prepared pursuant to the Endangered Species Act (hereinafter
"ESA"), the Fish and Wildlife Service (hereinafter "FWS") opinion
advises against the proposed state water project because the developments
would threaten the existence of the delta smelts. FWS sought to prohibit
the water district members from proceeding with the developments as
planned. In response, the water district members, including the San Luis
& Delta-Mendota Water Authority, argue that the application of the ESA's
"take prohibition" and interagency cooperation provision to the delta smelt
was an invalid exercise of authority under the Commerce Clause of the
U.S. Constitution because "the delta smelt is a purely 'intrastate species,'
and because it has no commercial value." Each party moved for summary
judgment.
Section 9(a)(1)(B)-(C) of the ESA forbids any "person" to "take"
any endangered species of fish or wildlife "within the United States or the
territorial sea of the United States" or "upon the high seas[.]" The ESA
defines "person" broadly to include "an individual, corporation,
partnership, trust, association . . . or any other entity subject to the
jurisdiction of the United States." To "take" is defined as to "harass,
harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to
attempt to engage in any such conduct."
The court held that the water district members lacked standing to
challenge the application of the take prohibition provision in this case,
because plaintiffs did not show a causal connection between their injury
and the application of the take prohibition clause to the coordinated
operation of the proposed projects. Further, the claim was unripe in that it
was a premature adjudication of a dispute which had not yet arisen. There
were no concrete plans on the part of project operators to violate the ESA,
no communication of a specific warning or threat to initiate enforcement
proceedings, nor any history of past prosecution or enforcement against
the project operators.
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The court also held that the application of the section of the ESA
governing interagency cooperation so as to require federal agencies to
evaluate the effects of planned water project operations on the threatened
delta smelt was a valid exercise of authority under the Commerce Clause,
even though the delta smelt were a purely intrastate species. The ESA was
a general regulatory statute bearing a substantial relation to commerce,
and applying the ESA's interagency cooperation provision to an intrastate
species was an essential part of the larger regulatory scheme. One of the
ESA's regulatory goals was to protect the monetarily valuable resource of
the planet's biodiversity, and protecting biodiversity as a whole could not
have been accomplished by protecting only those species mobile enough





Ackerson v. Bean Dredging, L.L.C., 589 F.3d 196 (5th Cir. 2009)
Dredging is a technique used by environmental and infrastructural
planners that sucks or scrapes the bottom of waterways and then relocates
the "spoils" to a different location, typically for the purpose of reshaping
the waterway. In 2005, the United States Congress created the Mississippi
River Gulf Outlet (hereinafter "MRGO") dredging project in order to
provide a shorter water route between the Gulf of Mexico and the inner
harbor in New Orleans, Louisiana. This project employed numerous
dredge company contractors to perform yearly dredges, supervised by the
Army Corps of Engineers.
A common claim by environmentalists is that dredging upsets the
aquatic ecosystems in the dredged and dumped locations. Plaintiffs here
brought this consolidated class action against the United States and thirty-
two dredging company contractors involved in the MRGO project,
alleging that the numerous defendants caused environmental damage to
protected wetlands in the MRGO area. Also, Plaintiffs alleged that "the
MRGO project caused an amplification of the storm surge in the New
Orleans region during Hurricane Katrina," thus being a significant
contributing factor to the breached levees and flood walls that devastated
the St. Bernard and Orleans Parishes. Specifically, Plaintiffs asserted
claims against Defendants for negligence, breach of implied warranty,
concealment, and violation of environmental protection laws, while
seeking damages and an injunction from future dredging activities.
The United States was dismissed from the lawsuit as a party under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction due to governmental immunity. The remaining
defendants (hereinafter "Contractors") similarly filed a motion to dismiss
under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(c) claiming they had governmental immunity
due to their agency relationship. Although there were many issues in this
case, the most significant was whether the trial court properly found the
Contractors to have been acting as agents of the government and therefore
able to invoke governmental immunity to this lawsuit.
The district court dismissed the lawsuit in part because it
found that Contractors were acting as agents of the government by
performing a contract job under the supervision of the Army Corps of
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Engineers, and therefore they were protected by governmental immunity.
This appellate court reviewed de novo and affirmed the decision.
Plaintiffs challenged that Contractors had not proven they were acting in
an agency relationship, but this court rejected that argument and
determined that Contractors did not have that burden of proof. This court
looked at Yearsley v. WA. Ross Construction Co., a United States
Supreme Court case which did not require a public-works contractor
defendant to establish their relationship as an agent of the government.
Instead, the Yearsley court simply assumed that there was an agency
relationship when the contractor was hired to build dikes in the Missouri
River pursuant to a contract with the federal government. Due to the
similarity of these cases, this court determined that it too would consider
the contractors to be agents for purposes of determining whether there
may have been governmental immunity.
This court then applied the rule of Yearsley that agents and officers
of the government can only be found liable for wrongdoings if they exceed
their given authority or if they act without power conferred to them by the
federal government. Quoting from Myers v. United States, this court
explained that "to the extent that the work performed by [the contractor
defendant] was done under its contract . . . and in conformity with the
terms of said contract, no liability can be imposed upon it for any damages
claimed to have been suffered by the appellants." In this case, Plaintiffs
did not submit any evidence that Contractors acted outside the appropriate
bounds of their authority; rather, their actions were permitted as within the
scope defined by the United States Congress for the MRGO project.
Therefore, this court found no basis for Plaintiffs' claims and affirmed the
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